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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.  
 
This case requires us to consider whether, in assessing 
diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), 
the citizenship of a traditional trust is determined differently 
than that of a business trust.  In light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 136 
S. Ct. 1012 (2016), we conclude that the citizenship of a 
traditional trust is based only on the citizenship of its trustee.  
In so holding, we acknowledge that Americold Realty 
abrogates part of our opinion in Emerald Investors Trust v. 
Gaunt Parsippany Partners, 492 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2007), 
which stated that it was unnecessary to distinguish between 
types of trusts when determining diversity jurisdiction.  Id. at 
198 n.10, 205. 
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Based on the distinction we recognize today between 
traditional trusts and business trusts, we will vacate the District 
Court order dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction.  
Because the record on appeal is insufficient for us to proceed 
further, we will remand the case with instructions to determine 
whether the trusts at issue are of the traditional or business 
variety and whether there is diversity jurisdiction.  We also 
instruct the District Court to give leave to further amend the 
complaint within a reasonable time to cure defective 
jurisdictional allegations. 
 
I. BACKGROUND  
 
Following an investment opportunity gone awry, the 
details of which are immaterial at this point, GBForefront, 
L.P., filed suit in the District Court against Forefront 
Management Group, LLC (“FMG”); Forefront Capital 
Management, LLC; Forefront Capital Markets, LLC; and 
Forefront Advisory, LLC, (collectively, the “Defendants”) for 
breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  Initially, 
GBForefront, which is a limited partnership, had sued only 
FMG, a limited liability company (or “LLC”), and alleged that 
the Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
because, among other things, GBForefront’s general partner 
was an LLC whose sole member was a “resident” of 
Pennsylvania and “none of [FMG’s] members are residents of 
Pennsylvania.”1  (J.A. at 50, 719-20.)     
                                              
1 The pertinent language of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is, along 
with a brief description of diversity jurisdiction, provided in 
Section II.A, infra. 
The operative pleading is the first amended complaint.  
In that complaint, GBForefront refers to a “principal” of both 
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After years of litigation, GBForefront accepted an offer 
of judgment made by the Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 68.  The District Court accordingly entered 
judgment in favor of GBForefront and against the Defendants.  
Later, when a difficulty arose with satisfaction of the judgment, 
the parties submitted a joint motion to amend the judgment to 
effectuate a new settlement agreement.  Pursuant to the terms 
of that agreement, GBForefront and the Defendants signed a 
consent judgment against Forefront Capital Markets, and they 
agreed that, in the event of any default by the Defendants in 
satisfying the settlement, GBForefront could immediately file 
a motion to enter that consent judgment.  The District Court 
                                              
GBForefront General, LLC, and WFP2, LP.  (J.A. at 720.)  But 
in its initial complaint, GBForefront referred to a “member” of 
those entities.  (J.A. at 50.)  We understand GBForefront to be 
referring to the sole member of GBForefront’s general partner, 
GBForefront General, LLC, and to the sole member of Weiner 
2 General LLC, the general partner of GBForefront’s limited 
partner WFP2, LP. 
At the time the complaint was filed, GBForefront, L.P., 
was a limited partnership composed of a general partner, 
GBForefront General, LLC, and a limited partner, WPF2, LP.  
The sole member of GBForefront General was Warren Weiner, 
alleged to be a resident of Pennsylvania.  Limited partner 
WPF2 itself was a limited partnership composed of a general 
partner, Weiner 2 General LLC, and a series of five trusts as 
limited partners.  The sole member of Weiner 2 General LLC 
was Warren Weiner.  Those trusts were established for each of 
Warren Weiner’s five grandchildren with Warren Weiner 
designated as the trustee of each trust.  At least three of those 
grandchildren lived in New Jersey at the time the complaint 
was filed.   
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granted the joint motion, and everyone thought the case was 
over.   
 
It was not.  GBForefront soon alleged that “[c]ertain 
Forefront entities”2 had defaulted on the terms of the 
settlement agreement, and it thus moved for entry of the 
consent judgment.  (J.A. at 923).  With the assistance of new 
counsel, the Defendants cross-moved to dismiss the case for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that GBForefront 
had not adequately pled the citizenship of FMG and that 
complete diversity was lacking when the lawsuit was initially 
filed.  The parties briefed the issue of diversity jurisdiction, but 
then came a twist.  The Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Americold Realty, specifically dealing with the citizenship of 
trusts.   
 
After holding a hearing and considering the parties’ 
supplemental briefing on the new precedent, the District Court 
granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss because the Court 
determined the membership of GBForefront included at least 
three trusts whose beneficiaries were citizens of New Jersey3 
and FMG also had a member who was a citizen of New Jersey.4  
                                              
2 As the District Court noted, it is unclear which entities 
GBForefront was referring to.   
 
3 See supra n.1. 
 
4 GBForefront did not plead the citizenship of the 
beneficiaries and member in its complaint.  See infra Section 
II.B.  The District Court said that the parties had agreed at the 
hearing to those factual statements regarding the parties’ 
citizenship.  But nothing was said or agreed upon at the hearing 
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The Court reasoned that Emerald Investors instructed it not to 
distinguish between traditional trusts and business trusts for 
jurisdictional purposes, and that Americold Realty required the 
citizenship of a business trust to include all its members, 
including its beneficiaries.   
 
GBForefront timely appealed the dismissal.   
 
II. DISCUSSION5 
 
On appeal, GBForefront argues that the Americold 
Realty holding described by the District Court applies only to 
business trusts, while the trusts composing GBForefront are 
traditional trusts whose citizenship is based only on the 
citizenship of their trustees.  The Defendants of course 
disagree, asserting that Americold Realty requires that the 
citizenship of trust beneficiaries always be accounted for when 
determining diversity jurisdiction.  The Defendants further 
                                              
regarding the citizenship of Warren Weiner, the trustee of 
several of the trusts at issue.  See supra n.1. 
 
5 The parties dispute whether the District Court had 
jurisdiction.  GBForefront maintains that the District Court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there was 
diversity of citizenship.  The Defendants contend that the 
District Court lacked any jurisdiction.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Our review of the District 
Court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is de novo.”  In re Horizon 
Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632 
(3d Cir. 2017). 
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assert that GBForefront comprises a series of trusts whose 
beneficiaries’ citizenship prevents subject matter jurisdiction 
based on diversity.  The resolution of this jurisdictional dispute 
accordingly turns on the Supreme Court’s Americold Realty 
opinion.  In our view, that case instructs that, for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of a traditional trust must 
be determined by the citizenship of its trustee alone.6 
 
A. General Principles of Diversity Jurisdiction 
 
 It is fundamental that federal courts must have subject 
matter jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a case, and, as 
its name indicates, jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship 
requires that opposing parties be citizens of diverse states.  
Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Under the dictates of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), for 
diversity jurisdiction to exist, “no plaintiff [may] be a citizen 
of the same state as any defendant[,]” and the amount in 
controversy must exceed $75,000.7  Id. at 419.  A challenge to 
                                              
6 For simplicity, we express our holding in the singular 
with respect to the trustee, but, of course, nothing in our 
decision here limits the number of trustees or beneficiaries that 
a trust may have.  “Obviously[,] if there are more trustees or 
beneficiaries[,] then the [rule] is applied to all the trustees and 
beneficiaries.”  Emerald Investors, 492 F.3d at 201 n.12.  Thus, 
where a traditional trust has multiple trustees, we consider it to 
have the citizenship of each of its trustees. 
 
7 Section 1332(a) provides, in relevant part: “The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
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subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the 
litigation, and, when the jurisdictional basis is diversity of 
citizenship, diversity is assessed as of the time the complaint 
was filed.  Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 
567, 570-71 (2004). 
 
Most rules for determining the citizenship of natural 
persons and business entities are well-established.  Zambelli 
Fireworks, 592 F.3d at 419.  The citizenship of a natural person 
is the state where that person is domiciled.  Id.  The citizenship 
of a corporation is both its state of incorporation and the state 
of its principal place of business.  Id.  A partnership, as an 
unincorporated business entity, assumes the citizenship of all 
its partners.  Id.  Likewise, a limited liability company is a 
citizen of all the states of its members.  Id. at 420.  But, as this 
case demonstrates, there are still some rules in flux.  Hence the 
challenge to jurisdiction we address here. 
 
When a party raises an issue regarding a jurisdictional 
defect, courts must determine whether the challenge is a facial 
attack or a factual attack.  Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 
757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014).  “A facial attack ... is an 
argument that considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is 
insufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction of the court 
because, for example, ... there is no indication of a diversity of 
citizenship among the parties[.]”  Id. at 358.   
 
“A factual attack, on the other hand, is an argument that 
there is no subject matter jurisdiction because the facts of the 
case ... do not support the asserted jurisdiction.”  Id.  To resolve 
                                              
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... 
citizens of different States ... .” 
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a factual challenge, the “[c]ourt may look beyond the pleadings 
to ascertain the facts[.]”  Id.  Again, “for example, while 
diversity of citizenship might have been adequately pleaded by 
the plaintiff, the defendant can submit proof that, in fact, 
diversity is lacking.”  Id.  The defendant has the initial burden 
of production to raise a factual challenge.  See Washington v. 
Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 345 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(distinguishing between burden of proof and burden of 
production, in that the latter “determines which party must first 
present evidence sufficient to raise a given issue as pertinent”).  
Once a factual challenge has been raised, the plaintiff then has 
the burden of proof to establish diversity jurisdiction by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  McCann v. Newman 
Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 281, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
The Defendants here mounted both a facial challenge 
and a factual challenge to GBForefront’s assertion of diversity 
jurisdiction. 
 
B. Facial Challenge To Diversity Jurisdiction 
 
In the District Court, the Defendants’ facial challenge 
was “that GBForefront never alleged the citizenship of the 
members of the LLC defendant entities” in its complaint.  (J.A. 
at 6.)  The Court recognized that issue but did not resolve it 
because the Court concluded that diversity jurisdiction was 
lacking based on the Defendants’ factual challenge.8  On 
                                              
8 Although the District Court said that it was addressing 
a “facial attack[,]” the Court’s analysis actually addressed the 
Defendants’ factual attack because the Court considered 
information outside the pleadings, as agreed to by the parties   
(J.A. at 8).  The factual attack ultimately came down to a 
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appeal, the parties have not addressed the facial challenge at 
all.  We nevertheless have an independent obligation to address 
it.   
 
The Defendants are indeed correct that GBForefront 
failed to plead the citizenship of FMG’s members.  It failed 
even to plead its own citizenship.  Instead, GBForefront, a 
limited partnership, alleged that Warren Weiner, who was the 
sole member of the general partner of GBForefront and also 
the sole member of the general partner of the limited partner of 
GBForefront, was a “resident” of Pennsylvania and that “none 
of [FMG’s] members are residents of Pennsylvania”; nothing 
is mentioned about citizenship.9  (J.A. at 719-20); see supra 
note 1.  Alleging residency alone is insufficient to plead 
diversity of citizenship, McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 
213, 219 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012), while changing allegations of 
residency to ones of citizenship fortifies a complaint against a 
facial attack on jurisdiction, assuming there are no other 
obvious flaws.  See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 
800 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 2015) (“A State X plaintiff may 
therefore survive a facial challenge by alleging that none of the 
defendant association’s members are citizens of State X.”). 
 
                                              
question of law on how to determine the citizenship of certain 
trusts. 
 
9 In addition to not pleading citizenship, we also notice 
that the complaint lacks any reference to the identities of the 
limited partners of WFP2, which was the limited partner of 
GBForefront.  Other evidence in the record on appeal indicates 
that the limited partners of WFP2 were five trusts and that 
Warren Weiner was the trustee of each of those trusts.   
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The clear pleading problem here may be amenable to 
easy solution.  “Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be 
amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1653; see also Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-
Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832 (1989) (explaining that § 1653 
allows appellate courts to remedy inadequate jurisdictional 
allegations); Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 627 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (“[Section 1653] permits amendments broadly so as 
to avoid dismissal of diversity suits on technical grounds.” 
(citation omitted)).  Pursuant to that provision, we may allow 
the plaintiff to amend its complaint before us when the factual 
record on appeal establishes that complete diversity exists.  
McCurdy v. Greyhound Corp., 346 F.2d 224, 225 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1965).  Alternatively, we may instruct the district court on 
remand to allow the plaintiff to remedy its inadequate 
allegations of diversity jurisdiction.  Chem. Leaman Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 222 n.13, 
232 (3d Cir. 1999); see Barclay Square Props. v. Midwest Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Minneapolis, 893 F.2d 968, 969-70 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (remanding with instructions to allow the plaintiff 
to amend its complaint when the appellate court cannot 
determine complete diversity based on the record).  
Considerations of efficiency, fairness, and judicial economy 
often counsel against dismissal of an action at a late stage of 
litigation when a simple pleading error can be corrected.  
Zambelli Fireworks, 592 F.3d at 420-21. 
 
GBForefront’s diversity allegations appear to be 
nothing more than inartful drafting on a technical point, albeit 
a serious one.  Accordingly, because the factual record on 
appeal is insufficient for us to determine whether complete 
diversity existed when the complaint was filed, see infra 
Section II.C, we instruct the District Court to give GBForefront 
13 
 
the opportunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653 to remedy its 
defective jurisdictional allegations by filing, with the District 
Court and within a reasonable time, a motion with an 
appropriately amended complaint.10   
 
C. Factual Challenge To Diversity Jurisdiction 
 
We turn next to the Defendants’ factual challenge to 
diversity jurisdiction, which is simply that complete diversity 
was lacking when the lawsuit was filed.   
 
When a business entity consists of constituent parts that 
are also business forms, the inquiry into jurisdictional 
citizenship “can become quite complicated. ... [T]he 
citizenship of unincorporated associations must be traced 
through however many layers of partners or members there 
may be.”  Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 800 F.3d at 105 n.16 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  This is such a 
case, with trusts serving as limited partners of a limited 
partnership that is in turn a limited partner of GBForefront.  See 
supra note 1 (describing GBForefront’s ownership structure).  
And that is on just one side of the “v.”  The Defendants’ factual 
challenge hinges on the proper interpretation of Americold 
Realty in determining the citizenship of the several trusts that 
are layered within GBForefront. 
 
                                              
10 In addition to alleging citizenship, not residency, the 
amended complaint must add the identities and citizenship of 
the limited partners of WFP2, which, if trusts, must also 
include their trustees.  If such amendment would destroy 
diversity, the complaint must be dismissed. 
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1. Jurisdictional Citizenship When A 
Trust Is Involved In A Lawsuit 
 
Through a progression of cases, the Supreme Court has 
established three rules for determining jurisdictional 
citizenship when a trust is involved in a lawsuit. 
 
First, in Navarro Savings Association v. Lee, 446 U.S. 
458 (1980), the Court said that, when a trustee sues or is sued 
on behalf of a trust, the citizenship of the trust is based on that 
of the trustee alone.  Id. at 465-66; see also Americold Realty, 
136 S. Ct. at 1016.  In such cases, trustees may invoke diversity 
jurisdiction based on their own citizenship, without accounting 
for the citizenship of the trust’s beneficiaries.  Navarro, 446 
U.S. at 465-66.  In Navarro, eight individual trustees of a trust 
organized under Massachusetts law sued a savings association 
in federal court on a breach of contract claim.  Id. at 459.  The 
citizenship of the trustees differed from that of the savings 
association, but some of the trust’s beneficiaries were citizens 
of the same state as the savings association.  Id. at 460.  
Because the trustees who initiated the lawsuit “possesse[d] 
certain customary powers to hold, manage, and dispose of” 
trust properties, the trustees were permitted “to sue in their own 
right, without regard to the citizenship of the trust 
beneficiaries.”  Id. at 464-66.  Although the trust in some 
respects more closely resembled a business association than a 
traditional trust, the Supreme Court said that when trustees 
initiate a lawsuit in their own name or are the target of a suit, 
courts consider only the citizenship of the trustees for purposes 
of determining diversity jurisdiction.  Id. at 465-66; see also 
Americold Realty, 136 S. Ct. at 1016. 
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Second, in Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185 
(1990), the Court held that, when an artificial legal entity 
besides a corporation sues or is sued, diversity is determined 
by looking to the citizenship of the entity’s members.  Id. at 
195; see also Americold Realty, 136 S. Ct. at 1016.  In that 
particular case, a limited partnership brought a contract dispute 
to federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction.  Carden, 494 
U.S. at 186.  One limited partner of the partnership was a 
citizen of the same state as that of a defendant.  Id.  The limited 
partnership argued that jurisdiction should be determined 
solely on the basis of the citizenship of its general partners, 
who “have exclusive and complete management and control of 
the operations of the partnership[,]” akin to the approach taken 
with the trust at issue in Navarro.  Id. at 192 (citation omitted).  
The Supreme Court declined to extend its reasoning from 
Navarro, though, saying that “Navarro had nothing to do with 
the citizenship of the ‘trust,’ since it was a suit by the trustees 
in their own names.”  Id. at 192-93.  Carden, in contrast, 
concerned determining the citizenship of “an artificial entity, 
[i.e., a limited partnership,] suing or being sued[.]”  Id. at 192.  
Ultimately, the Court held that the citizenship of a limited 
partnership is based on the citizenship of all its partners; that 
is, the citizenship of each general and limited partner.  Id. at 
195-96. 
 
Finally, in Americold Realty, the Supreme Court 
decided that the citizenship of a business trust includes the 
citizenship of all its members.  136 S. Ct. at 1016.  The dispute 
involved a group of corporations whose goods perished in a 
warehouse fire.  Id. at 1014.  They brought a breach-of-contract 
suit in state court against the warehouse owner, which was a 
real estate investment trust (“REIT”).  Id.  The REIT removed 
the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.  Id.  On 
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appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit looked at the citizenship of the REIT’s members for 
purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed that choice.  Id. at 1014-15.  The 
Supreme Court likened the REIT to other unincorporated 
business associations, like joint-stock companies or 
partnerships, each of which has as its citizenship the 
citizenship of its members.  Id. at 1016.  The Court declined to 
base its reasoning on Navarro, because, “[a]s [it] ha[s] 
reminded litigants before, ... Navarro had nothing to do with 
the citizenship of [a] trust.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted and last alteration in original) (citing Carden, 494 U.S. 
at 192-93).  It was instead about the trustees’ citizenship.  The 
Navarro rule – that the jurisdictional citizenship of a trustee 
filing a lawsuit in his own name is the state where he is 
domiciled – is compatible with the rule applied to REITs and 
other business trusts, namely, that the jurisdictional citizenship 
of an artificial entity suing or being sued in its name includes 
the citizenship of each of its constituent members.  Id. 
 
Citing our decision in Emerald Investors Trust v. Gaunt 
Parsippany Partners, 492 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2007), the 
Supreme Court noted the challenge courts have had in deciding 
how to assign citizenship for jurisdictional purposes when a 
trust is a party to a suit.  Id.  The Court said: 
 
confusion regarding the citizenship of a trust is 
understandable and widely shared.  See Emerald 
Investors ... (discussing various approaches 
among the Circuits).  The confusion can be 
explained, perhaps, by tradition.  Traditionally, a 
trust was not considered a distinct legal entity, 
but a “fiduciary relationship” between multiple 
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people.  Such a relationship was not a thing that 
could be haled into court; legal proceedings 
involving a trust were brought by or against the 
trustees in their own name.  And when a trustee 
files a lawsuit or is sued in her own name, her 
citizenship is all that matters for diversity 
purposes. Navarro, 446 U.S., at 462–466 ... .  For 
a traditional trust, therefore, there is no need to 
determine its membership, as would be true if the 
trust, as an entity, were sued. 
 
Id. (some citations omitted).  The Court then went on to 
distinguish business trusts from traditional trusts, as follows: 
 
Many States, however, have applied the “trust” 
label to a variety of unincorporated entities that 
have little in common with this traditional 
template.  Maryland, for example, treats a real 
estate investment trust as a “separate legal 
entity” that itself can sue or be sued.  So long as 
such an entity is unincorporated, we apply our 
“oft-repeated rule” that it possesses the 
citizenship of all its members.  Carden, 494 U.S., 
at 195, ... .  But neither this rule nor Navarro 
limits an entity’s membership to its trustees just 
because the entity happens to call itself a trust. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 
While there has been some question about what the 
Court meant when it said, “[f]or a traditional trust, therefore, 
there is no need to determine its membership, as would be true 
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if the trust, as an entity, were sued,”11 one thing seems clear: 
the Court was declaring that, because a business trust is an 
artificial legal entity and a traditional trust is not, the 
citizenship of a traditional trust must be determined differently 
than that of a business trust.12  Id.  We therefore conclude that 
the citizenship of a traditional trust is based solely on that of its 
trustee.  The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second 
                                              
11 “For example, does the phrase mean that there is no 
need to determine entity membership for diversity purposes 
when a ‘traditional trust’ is sued as an entity?  Or do we read 
the statement to mean that a trust sued as an entity must prove 
entity membership because it is a separate legal person from 
the individual trustees?”  Zoroastrian Ctr. & Darb-E-Mehr of 
Metro. Wash., D.C. v. Rustam Guiv Found. of N.Y., 822 F.3d 
739, 749 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 
12 Even before Americold Realty, the law distinguished 
between traditional and business trusts in general and for 
purposes of tax treatment, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
§ 1 cmt. b (1959) (“[A] trust as a device for carrying on 
business is not within the scope of the Restatement of this 
Subject. ... The business trust is a special kind of business 
association and can best be dealt with in connection with other 
business associations.”); see also Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 
U.S. 344, 357 (1935) (“In what are called ‘business trusts’ the 
object is not to hold and conserve particular property, with 
incidental powers, as in the traditional type of trusts, but to 
provide a medium for the conduct of a business and sharing its 
gains.”), but not explicitly for jurisdictional purposes.  After 
Americold Realty, courts have provided more guidance.  See 
infra Section II.C.2 (distinguishing traditional and business 
trusts). 
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Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have concluded the same.  See 
Raymond Loubier Irrevocable Tr. v. Loubier, 858 F.3d 719, 
722 (2d Cir. 2017) (“We conclude that legal proceedings 
involving such traditional trusts are effectively brought by or 
against their trustees and, thus, it is the trustees’ citizenship, 
not that of beneficiaries, that matters for purposes of 
diversity.”); Wang ex rel. Wong v. New Mighty U.S. Tr., 843 
F.3d 487, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he citizenship of a 
traditional trust depends only on the trustees’ citizenship[.]”), 
cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2266, 198 L.Ed.2d 699 
(2017); see also Momenian v. Davidson, 878 F.3d 381, 389 
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting same language from Wang ex rel. 
Wong v. New Mighty U.S. Trust).   
 
That interpretation of Americold Realty is consistent 
with the larger context of the Court’s opinion, which focuses 
on the distinction between traditional trusts and business trusts, 
while a contrary reading is not.  It would be inconsistent with 
Americold Realty to say, as the Defendants urge here, that a 
traditional trust cannot be brought into court but nevertheless 
can sue or be sued as an entity.  Wang, 843 F.3d at 494. 
 
In sum, following the clarification in Americold Realty, 
the citizenship of a traditional trust is only that of its trustee, 
while that of a business entity called a trust is that of its 
constituent owners.  Americold Realty thus effectively 
abrogates our conclusion in Emerald Investors that traditional 
and business trusts need not be treated differently when 
determining citizenship for diversity jurisdiction.  Emerald 
Investors, 492 F.3d at 198 n.10.  Emerald Investors involved a 
trust suing partnerships to “recover[] on two unpaid 
promissory notes and foreclosure of ... mortgages securing the 
notes.”  Id. at 193.  To determine diversity jurisdiction, the 
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district court considered the citizenship of the trust’s 
beneficiary, but not that of its trustee.  Id. at 198.  We remanded 
to the district court with instructions to determine diversity 
jurisdiction based on the citizenship of both the trustee and 
beneficiary.  Id. at 205.  In arriving at that conclusion, in light 
of Carden and Navarro, we assessed four alternatives for 
determining the citizenship of a trust – “(a) look to the 
citizenship of the trustee only; (b) look to the citizenship of the 
beneficiary only; (c) look to the citizenship of either the trustee 
or the beneficiary depending on who is in control of the trust 
in the particular case; and (d) look to the citizenship of both the 
trustee and the beneficiary.”  Id. at 201.  We chose option 
(d) – look to the citizenship of both the trustee and beneficiary.  
Id.  Importantly, we declined to distinguish between traditional 
and business trusts, saying, “[o]ur research ... has not led us to 
conclude that the type of trust calls for a difference in treatment 
when determining a trust’s citizenship for diversity of 
citizenship jurisdictional purposes.”  Id. at 198 n.10. 
 
Americold Realty, necessarily changes that conclusion.  
As already explained, it instructs that there is a difference of 
jurisdictional significance between traditional trusts – which 
embody a fiduciary relationship – and business trusts – which, 
though they bear the “trust” name, are unincorporated business 
entities.  Given the Supreme Court’s analysis, we now 
recognize the abrogation of that part of our holding in Emerald 
Investors that treated the analysis of the jurisdictional 
citizenship of business trusts the same as that of traditional 
trusts. 
 
2. Distinguishing Between Traditional 
And Business Trusts In This Case 
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The remaining question is how to distinguish between 
traditional and business trusts.  The primary point of distinction 
is, again, in light of Americold Realty, that a traditional trust 
exists as a fiduciary relationship and not as a distinct legal 
entity.  136 S. Ct. at 1016 (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts § 2).  Another general distinction between traditional 
and business trusts is that a traditional trust facilitates a 
donative transfer, whereas a business trust implements a 
bargained-for exchange.  See S.I. Strong, Congress and 
Commercial Trusts: Dealing with Diversity Jurisdiction Post-
Americold, 69 Fla. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 14-
15), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2834023 (citing law review 
articles for that proposition); see also Wang, 843 F.3d at 494-
95 (concluding trust at issue was a traditional trust because, 
among other reasons, it was donative trust under D.C. law).  
 
There are thus at least two inquiries a court should 
undertake when deciding whether, for diversity purposes, a 
trust is of the “traditional” or “business” variety.  First, the 
court ought to look to the law of the state where the trust was 
formed to determine whether the trust has the status of a 
juridical person.  Raymond Loubier, 858 F.3d at 730-31 
(looking to Florida state law); Wang, 843 F.3d at 494-95 
(looking to D.C. law).  Comparing the state law on business 
trusts and more traditional trust relationships may facilitate a 
determination of which type is better suited to describe the trust 
at issue.  Wang, 843 F.3d at 494-95.  At the same time, 
however, the particular labels affixed by state law are not of 
themselves determinative.  See Americold Realty, 136 S. Ct. at 
1016 (noting that a trust entity’s membership is not limited to 
only its trustees “just because the entity happens to call itself a 
trust”); Navarro, 446 U.S. at 472 & n.5 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that state law is “relevant” but not 
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“dispositive” to threshold questions of federal jurisdiction).  
Ultimately, our jurisdiction is based on constitutional and 
federal statutory authority, not state law.  Penn Gen. Cas. Co. 
v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S. 189, 197 (1935). 
 
The second, and closely related, inquiry the court 
should make focuses on the purpose of the trust – a traditional 
trust facilitates a donative transfer, Wang, 843 F.3d at 495, 
while a business trust implements a bargained-for exchange, 
Strong, supra, at 14-15.  Principles described in the Second 
Restatement of Trusts, a source on which we have relied to 
identify whether an express trust has been created, see In re 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 484 F.2d 1300, 1305 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959)), can be 
informative in that inquiry.13 
 
Here, the Defendants argue that, even if the trusts at 
issue were traditional trusts, we should still look to their 
beneficiaries to determine diversity because of the trusts’ 
positioning within the layers of GBForefront’s ownership 
structure.  The Defendants point out that the trusts did not 
initiate the lawsuit, and rather are relevant only for 
                                              
13 The Second Restatement of Trusts describes 
traditional rather than business trusts.  Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts § 1 cmt. b (1959) (explaining the scope of the Second 
Restatement of Trusts); see supra n.12.  It defines a “trust” as 
“a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting 
the person by whom the title to the property is held to equitable 
duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another 
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an 
intention to create it.”  Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 
(1959). 
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jurisdictional purposes because they are limited partners of a 
limited partnership that in turn is a limited partner of the 
partnership that actually initiated the lawsuit.  See supra note 1 
(describing GBForefront’s ownership structure).  According to 
the Defendants, Americold Realty, Carden, and Navarro can 
be distinguished as applying only when the trust or trustee was 
the party that sued or was sued.  Thus, they argue, the trust 
entities are involved in the lawsuit through the layers of 
GBForefront’s ownership structure, so their beneficiaries are 
necessarily involved too.  We disagree. 
 
The rules for determining citizenship do not change 
depending on whether a trust is embedded within another 
business entity.  See Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 800 F.3d at 105 
n.16 (stating rule to trace citizenship through “however many 
layers of partners or members there may be” (citation 
omitted)); cf. Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 
337, 348-49 (3d Cir. 2013) (determining citizenship of plaintiff 
LLC, whose sole member was a corporation, as the states of 
incorporation and principal place of business of the 
corporation).  Given the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Americold Realty, the jurisdictional citizenship of a traditional 
trust is only that of its trustee.  That rule is definitive. 
 
Unfortunately, the record on appeal is insufficient for us 
to apply that rule to resolve the Defendants’ factual challenge 
to diversity jurisdiction in this case.  In particular, the record is 
insufficient because GBForefront comprised five trusts but the 
record only contains the trust instrument for one of them.  We 
must, therefore, remand to the District Court with instructions 
for it to determine, based on the foregoing guidance, whether 
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the trusts at issue are traditional or business trusts and thus 
whether there is diversity jurisdiction.14 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court order 
dismissing the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
14 Other arguments that GBForefront raised on appeal 
are moot in light of our holding. 
